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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
failed to make out a prima facie case because of insufficient
evidence. 32
This decision also indicates that the Supreme Court has
retained the traditional approach that jeopardy attaches when the
jury is sworn, even though the first witness has not taken the
stand and no evidence has been produced. Thus, the Court has
apparently rejected the test employed by the Model Penal Code.
This choice is unfortunate, for it continues an illogical distinction
between jury and non-jury trials. In all cases, jeopardy should
attach at the same stage of the proceedings, regardless of who
is the trier of the facts.33
The rigid standard which the Supreme Court has adopted
runs counter to many of its prior decisions in this area, which
generally stressed flexibility. 34 The reason for choosing this course
is not apparent, since no widespread abuse of discretion by trial
courts seems to exist. While it is important to safeguard the
rights of those accused of crime, we should also keep in mind
that the fair administration of justice demands that the public
be permitted to try the accused. This "public right" ought not
to be defeated because of an inconsequential failure of the
prosecutor to have the witnesses in the courtroom.
M
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - MEXICAN DIVORCE WHERE BOTH
PARTIES APPEARE DECLARED INVALID. - In an action for separa-
tion, the defendant husband counterclaimed for annulment alleging
that a Mexican divorce procured by his wife from her former
spouse was a nullity. Both parties appeared in the Mexican
action, the plaintiff personally and her former husband by appointed
attorney. In granting the annulment and declaring the divorce
invalid, the New York Supreme Court held that since neither
spouse was domiciled in Mexico, the foreign court was without
jurisdiction as we commonly understand that term. Wood v. Wood,
(Sup. Ct.), 150 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1963, p. 5, col. 7.
New York attorneys are very often confronted with the
necessity of advising their clients on foreign divorce because
"New York's antiquated divorce law just simply does not resolve
the problem when the parties to a marriage have reached the end
32 See text accompanying note 26 .upra.
33 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.09, comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
34 See, e.g., Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 648 (1949); United States v.
Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
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of their rope... ." I Furthermore, once the spouses have absolutely
decided on divorce as the only solution to their marital problems, the
following inquiries are typically made: where can we go, how long
will it take, how much will it cost, and, will it be recognized where I
live? The answer to the first question is, many times, Mexico 2
or Nevada 3 - the forums of the "quickie divorce." 4 Compared
to Mexico's famous "one hour" or "one day" decree, Nevada
law seems almost restrictive with its six week residency require-
ment. If time is not prohibitive to the prospective divorcee, cost
may be. It has been reported that a Mexican divorce, the least
expensive, will generally cost 600 dollars and a Reno action
will cost nearly twice that amount.5 It appears that neither the
high cost nor the travel seems an effective deterrent to parties
determined to dissolve their marriage. A recent newspaper article
discussing Wood v. Wood reported that more than 250,000 persons
in New York City hold Mexican divorce decrees. 6
The last question posed above, i.e., whether the foreign decree
will have the same effect everywhere, is the most critical. This
question of recognition takes on great importance in the United
States where each of the fifty states is considered sovereign in
the matter of divorce.7  The Supreme Court of the United
States stated in Williams v. North Carolina (II), that divorce
touches a basic interest of society and "since divorce, like marriage,
creates a new status, every consideration of policy makes it
desirable that the effect should be the same wherever the question
arises."s
IAlabama and Mexican Divorces, 7 PRAc. LAW. 75, 77 (March 1961).
This statement was made by the Honorable Morris Ploscowe, a former
City Magistrate in New York City, at a symposium sponsored by the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Federal Bar
Association of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut on December
12, 1960.
2 For a discussion of Mexican divorce law, see Berke, Mexican Divorces,
7 PRAc. LAW. 84 (March 1961).3 NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.020 (1957).
4 Under certain circumstances Alabama may be considered a "quickie
divorce" forum. Under Alabama law, a non-resident plaintiff must satisfy
a one-year residency requirement and become a domiciliary of the state
before instituting an action for divorce. This requirement is not applicable
in a case where the court has jurisdiction over both parties. In that case
there is not a specified length of residency and the plaintiff only has to
prove that he or she is a domiciliary of the state. ALA. CODE tit. 34,
§J 27, 29 (1958); see generally Reese, Alabama Divorces, 7 PRAc. LAW. 78
(March, 1961).
5 Porter, Hiqh Cost of Divorce, N.Y. Post, Sept. 30, 1963, (Magazine),
p. 2, col. 3. The figures include transportation, lawyers" fees, and living
expenses.
6 N.Y. Journal-American, Aug. 15, 1963, p. 3, col. 1.7 Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942).
8325 U.S. 226, 230 (1945). The Supreme Court of the United States
in viewing the social dangers of non-recognition of foreign decrees has
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In a series of decisions beginning with the Williams cases, 9
the Supreme Court attempted to protect the migratory divorce and
thus stabilize the marital status of individuals by insuring recognition
of foreign decrees. 10 The Court in effect created a "uniform divorce
law." The grounds for divorce still are not the same in each state,
but a valid decree dissolving the marriage is to have the same
effect everywhere.
The first instance of compulsory recognition of sister state
decrees was in Williams (I).I In that case the Court held that
an ex parte divorce decree was entitled to full faith and credit
when the plaintiff spouse has acquired a bona fide domicile in
the divorcing state. This principle was expanded upon in Williams
(II),12 where it was decided that a court in one state may re-
examine the jurisdictional fact of bona fide domicile when a divorce
decree is entered in an ex parte proceeding in a sister state.
A finding of domicile, therefore, does not preclude another state
from arriving at an opposite conclusion.
After establishing the doctrine of compulsory recognition of
foreign divorce decrees in Williams (I), the Court proceeded to
extend this doctrine and hence further stabilize the decree. In
Sherrer v. Sherrer,"3 the power to re-examine sister state judgments,
as recognized in Williams (II), was limited primarily to the
ex parte divorce. The Court stated that:
[T]he requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant from collaterally
attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional grounds in the courts of a sister
State where there has been participation by the defendant in the divorce
proceedings, where the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to con-
test the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such
collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the decree.14
Having already made the divorce decree based on the appearance
of both parties relatively free from collateral inquiry by the
parties, the Court added a further security in Johnson v. Muel-
berger,'5 wherein such decrees were held free from subsequent
attack by strangers as well as the parties.
stated: "Certainly if decrees of a state altering the marital status of its
domiciliaries are not valid throughout the Union even though the requirements
of procedural due process are wholly met, a rule would be fostered which
could not help but bring 'considerable disaster to innocent persons' and
'bastardize children hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage.'"
Williams v. North Carolina (I), supra note 7, at 301.
9Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v.
North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
10 ALL FAMILY LAw 124 (Clad ed. 1958).
"lWilliams v. North Carolina (I), supra note 9.
12 Williams v. North Carolina (I.), supra note 9.
13 334 U.S. 343 (1948) ; accord, Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
14 Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1948).
15340 U.S. 581 (1951).
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Thus, the Supreme Court, in applying the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution,16 has generally made recognition of
sister state decrees compulsory under the following circumstances:
(1) where both parties appear in the action 17 and (2) where
the action is ex parte and the plaintiff spouse has acquired a bona
fide domicile in the divorcing state.' 8
The presumption of validity enjoyed by sister state decrees
under the full faith and credit clause is not applicable, however,
to foreign country decrees. Recognition of these decrees is far
less certain and the judgments themselves more vulnerable than
sister state decrees.19 The Mexican divorce when recognized is
done so under the principle of comity.
Comity looks to the moral necessity to do justice, so that justice will be done
in return. If the forum is satisfied that the foreign divorce court had
jurisdiction, it will next consider whether or not the local public policy would
be violated by recognizing the decree.20
The question which arises then, is on what basis does a
Mexican court assume jurisdiction in divorce actions? The laws
of Chihuahua do not require bona fide domicile or residence as
a condition precedent to jurisdiction. The Chihuahua courts have
the power to proceed when the parties .expressly submit them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the court. This can be done in
person, by appointed attorney, or even through the mails. The
resulting decree would be valid in Mexico, for the court would
have jurisdiction as they commonly understand that term.2 '
The New York court, in Wood v. Wood, justified its exam-
ination of the Mexican decree based on the appearance of both
parties, by distinguishing it from "American decrees." The court
16 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
'
7 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951); Coe v. Coe, mtpra note
13; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
ls Williams v. North Carolina (I), mtpra note 9.
19 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 376, 130 N.E.2d 902, 904
(1955).20ALL FAmiLy LAW 132 (Clad ed. 1958).
21 Berke, Mexican Divorces, 7 PRAc. LAW. 84 (March 1961). The follow-
ing are extracts from a divorce decree issued by a Civil Court in the City
of Juarez, State of Chihuahua, Mexico on May 11, 1962, which exemplify
such consent jurisdiction: "The suit was entered and notification to the
defendant was ordered, and as the plaintiff . . . appeared personally to
file her complaint, she was notified of 'said order and she then declared:
That she ratifies the divorce complaint in all its parts, including her express
submission to the jurisdiction of this Court. Through his motion filed today,
Mr. Carlos Monges Caldera appeared in Court as attorney in fact for the
defendant . . . and answered the complaint, admitting its allegations in
all its parts and stating that he submits his principal expressly to the
jurisdiction of this Court and asking for a decision, which is now rendered.
1963 ]
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relied by analogy on Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum,22 where it was
stated that New York courts under principles of comity have
the power to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments
of foreign countries for policy reasons, no matter what allega-
tions of jurisdiction appear on the face of the foreign decree.
Before recognizing the decree under the principles of comity the
court must "at least accept the basis of jurisdiction upon which
the foreign court acted as a proper basis as 'we understand'
jurisdiction .. ,, 23
Since there were no allegations or findings of domicile or
residence in the foreign action, the court held that the Mexican
forum based its jurisdiction wholly on the appearances of both
parties and their expressed submission to the jurisdiction of the
Chihuahua court. Thus, it appeared that the only interest the
Mexican forum had in the marital status was the fact that the
parties agreed to allow the Chihuahua court to dissolve their
marriage. Judge Coleman in Wood, stated that the parties had
"simply said we are here-in person or through attorney-
and 'let us have a divorce.' "24 He noted that there was not
even the slightest semblance or color of jurisdiction justifying
action by the Mexico court. One cannot "'confer' jurisdiction or
power over their status upon Chihuahua by a fleeting call upon
its courts and a mailing of a paper to someone to present to
the court." 25 Thus, although the decree in Wood is valid in
Mexico, the New York court refused recognition.
In Wood, the court explains jurisdiction, as we commonly
understand that term in matrimonial matters, by stating:
We insist upon a link of some length and of some degree of permanence
actual or prospective, between the spouses and the sovereignty which assumes
to exercise power over them in relation to the marital status. Unless there
is that link, the sovereignty has no power to act.26
Judge Coleman implies that this "link" must be domicile,27 and
thus, at least one of the parties must be a domiciliary of the
divorcing forum. If domicile is a prerequisite to jurisdiction in
all divorce proceedings, then there can be no doubt that the
22 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, s=pra note 19, at 375, 130 N.E2d at
903.23 Wood v. Wood, (Sup. Ct.), 150 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1963, p. 5,
col. 7.2 4 Id. at 6, *col. 1.
25 Id. at 6, col. 3.
26 Id. at 6, col. 1.
27 Ibid. Residence means living in a particular locality, and. simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place. Domicile means
living in that locality with the intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.
Foote v. Foote, 192 Misc. 270, 274, 77 N.Y.S.2d 60, 65 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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decision in Wood is correct, since neither the plaintiff nor her
former husband were domiciliaries of Chihuahua.
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never
held domicile to be a jurisdictional prerequisite, the "domicile
doctrine" is recognized by most states. All fifty states have
divorce laws that provide for some requirement of residency or
domicile as a prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction, and in most
states domicile is the only basis for such jurisdiction.2 8  The
rationale behind this requirement is: (1) divorce is in the nature
of an in rem proceeding and the marital status constitutes the
res; (2) since marriage is of great public concern, the state has
an interest in creating and dissolving the res; (3) the state must
have some nexus or link with the res before it can validly alter it;
(4) the res exists where the parties are domiciled and if they
are separated, the res exists in two places; and (5) only the
place of domicile of at least one of the spouses has jurisdiction
over the res and hence power to dissolve it.2 9 It has been said
that "the idea that divorce is based on domicile is too firmly
rooted in our law to be changed at the present time." 30
However, the "domicile doctrine," although generally accepted,
is not always strictly adhered to. In fact, domicile may be con-
sidered as only one criterion upon which jurisdiction may be
assumed. Several other factors may provide a "link" between
the marital res and the divorcing forum which would allow a
court to entertain jurisdiction. An example can be found in a
New York statute which recognizes the place of the marriage
ceremony as an adequate "link." 31 Parties who marry in this
state can always invoke the jurisdiction of the New York courts
in divorce proceedings even though they are no longer residents
or domiciliaries. Although this exception to the "domicile doctrine"
is not applicable to the Wood case since the divorcing parties
did not marry in Mexico, it is evidence of the fact that New
York is not strictly committed to the "domicile doctrine" and will
recognize some other relationship between the state and litigants
as an adequate basis for jurisdiction. Other evidence may be
found in the many cases where New York courts have been
willing to accept the appearance of the plaintiff in Mexico and
the appearance of the defendant by appointed attorney as a suf-
ficient "link" between the marital status of New Yorkers and the
28 Berke, supra note 21, at 88; see Note, 44 IowA L. RE v. 765 (1959);
Ligon, Is Domicile A Jurisdictional Prerequisite To A Valid Divorce Decree?
3 JA BULL. 9 (Jan. 1961).29 Ligon, supra note 28, at 10.
30ALL FAmjILy LAw 125 (Clad. ed. 1958).
31 N.Y. Dom. RxI.. LAW § 170; David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc.
455, 129 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954). For other exceptions to the
"domicile doctrine," see Ligon, supra note 28, at 13.
19631
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Mexico court. 32  New York courts have declared Mexican ex
parte divorces and "mail order" decrees void in the past, but have
never declared a divorce, where both parties appeared, void for
lack of jurisdiction. Therefore, Judge Coleman's insistence on
domicile as a jurisdictional prerequisite is inconsistent with the
majority of New York cases. A decision recognizing the Mexican
decree would have been supported by ample precedent. 33
The effect of Wood v. Wood is still a matter of conjecture.
If this case is followed the courts may examine Mexican decrees
more carefully, since they will insist upon a more substantial
nexus between the parties and the foreign jurisdiction. This would
alter existing New York law under which \ the courts recognize
Mexican decrees on little more than the fact that one party
physically appeared in Mexico and the other appeared by attorney.34
The appellate courts will have to determine whether Judge
Coleman's sound reasoning is more persuasive than the hardships
that would emanate from affirming. One consideration which
must be reckoned with is the decided policy of the Supreme
Court of the United States to stabilize divorce judgments in
order to avoid " 'considerable disaster to innocent persons.'" 35
Although the Court's decisions only safeguard "American divorces,"
would not the same "disasters" occur if this policy or attitude
was not applied to the 250,000 persons holding Mexican decrees
in New York City? There is no doubt that a New York appellate
court would have many precedents to rely on if it decided to
reverse the lower court's decision. These precedents may not
be cloaked with Judge Coleman's sound logic and may have
been decided more by "winking at the law" instead of applying it,
but they are rooted in a social awareness of the disasters that
would occur if all Mexican divorces could be invalidated. The
"quickie divorce" has not been eliminated by Wood v. Wood,
but until New York's position is clarified, it may be assumed
that New Yorkers will be taking their divorce litigation to liberal
sister states like Nevada, instead of Mexico.
32 E.g., Heine v. Heine, 231 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. 1962), aff'd mein.,
(App. Div. 2d Dep't), 149 N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1963, p. 18, col. 4, leave to
appeal denied, (App. Div. 2d Dep't), 150 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1963, p. 13,
col. 1; Laff v. Laff, 5 Misc. 2d 554, 160 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
inem., 4 App. Div. 2d 874, 166 N.Y.S.2d 678 (2d Dep't), leave to appeal
denied, 4 App. Div. 2d 959, 168 N.Y.S.2d 470 (2d Dep't 1957); Caswell v.
Caswell, 111 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd nzemn., 280 App. Div. 969, 117
N.Y.S.2d 326 (1st Dep't 1952).33 Iid.
34 Berke, Mexican Divorces, 7 PRAc. LAW. 84, 87 (March 1961).35 Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 301 (1942).
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